THE EU AND AFRICA
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(editors)

The EU and Africa

From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa

HURST & COMPANY, LONDON
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Even though the European Union (EU) has been Africa’s largest trading partner over the last five decades, this is an area in which few African institutions have produced academically rigorous and policy-relevant knowledge. This volume seeks to correct this anomaly and to contribute to a better understanding of the historically difficult relationship between Africa and the EU in the areas of history, politics, economics, security, migration, and identity. The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) in Cape Town, South Africa, organised two research and policy seminars on relations between Africa and the EU in October/November 2007 and September 2008. Both meetings sought to foster greater understanding of the political, economic, and security aspects of this important relationship. We thank the 21 authors on three continents involved in this volume who demonstrated great professionalism, perseverance, and punctiliousness during what must sometimes have seemed a tortuous editing process. The editors also wish to thank all the participants at the two meetings in 2007 and 2008 who shared their rich insights with us and provided substantive and candid feedback to the authors in this volume which greatly strengthened their chapters. These have all been revised and updated to take into account the tremendous changes that have occurred in the world over the last few years.

The two policy briefs and policy reports produced from the seminars in 2007 and 2008 have been widely employed by African and European policymakers, academics, and civil society actors in their work. This unique 22-chapter book will be similarly disseminated, and contains rich insights from African and European scholars and practitioners, as well as an Asian and an American scholar. We hope that it will be useful for African, European, and other scholars and policymakers with an interest in relations
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

between both continents. It is important that academic institutions on both continents engage constructively on these issues for the mutual benefit of both Africa and the EU. In conducting research for this book, the editors also visited Brussels twice between 2008 and 2010 and interviewed key officials in both the Secretariat and government of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Group, as well as EU Commission, Council, and Parliament officials. We wish to thank all the officials—too numerous to mention—who patiently and generously shared their practical insights and vast experience with us. We aim to disseminate the main findings of this project directly to these policymakers as well as to key regional organisations in Africa. There are many others in the academic world and in the private sector, as well as in diverse parts of the media, whose perceptions and insights have played a part that would often surprise them in moulding our own appreciation of such complex and multi-dimensional subject matter.

We would like to thank Jason Cook for copyediting the manuscript so meticulously. Jonathan Derrick also deserves credit for his copyediting efforts. We thank Michael Dwyer, Daisy Leitch, and the team at Hurst Publishers who drove this process; Meredith Howard at Columbia University; and Veronica Klipp and Roshan Cader at Wits University Press.

Finally, we would like to thank the staff and board of the Centre for Conflict Resolution for the support that allowed us to complete this project. We must especially acknowledge the tremendous assistance of CCR researchers Dawn Nagar and Elizabeth Otitodun, and the centre’s librarian Margaret Struthers, as well as other colleagues in the training, communications, finance, and human resources departments. We also wish to thank the main funders of CCR’s Africa programme, who supported the production of this book: the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden. All three are appropriately the governments of EU states that have traditionally strongly supported both African development efforts and the European project.

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INTRODUCTION

Kaye Whiteman

This book offers a holistic and comprehensive assessment of the relations of the European Union with Africa, focusing on their historical, political, socio-economic and cultural dimensions. In the high imperial period in the early twentieth century, some in Europe advocated the idea of *Eurafrique*—a formula for putting Africa’s resources at the disposal of Europe’s industries. After tracing Europe’s historical attempts to remodel relations following African independence beginning in the 1960s, and Europe’s own quest for unity, the book examines the current strategic dimensions of the relationship, especially the place of Africa in Europe’s own need for global partnerships. Key issues are then analysed, from trade and investment to the growing priorities of security and governance, through case histories of the role of key European players in Africa—France, Britain, Portugal, and the Nordics—within the context of the EU. The volume concludes by examining the important issues of migration and identity, especially in view of Europe’s controversial immigration policies and complex relations with the Maghreb and the Mediterranean, as well as perceptions of past and current European identity.

For some time, there has clearly been a need for an overarching study of the relations of the European Union with Africa. This is a pioneering volume focusing on this important relationship, written mostly by African and Euro-
pean scholars and practitioners, but also involving a Pakistani and an American citizen. The book is sponsored by the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) in Cape Town, South Africa—which organised two policy seminars on Africa-Europe relations, in November 2007 and September 2008—and represents a groundbreaking effort by an African think-tank to enter a field hitherto largely dominated by institutions in Europe. The aim of this study is to encourage a constructive dialogue between scholars, policymakers, civil society groups, and the general public interested in Africa and Europe.

The EU-Africa Strategy put forward at the summit in the Portuguese capital of Lisbon in December 2007, and reviewed at the Tripoli summit in Libya in November 2010, has refocused on a subject that had seemed to drift down the Brussels agenda, even as the question is repeatedly asked: what kind of relationship should there be between the two continents? At present, Africa and Europe seem still not to have fully escaped from the burden of history. Also, their relations are beset by the ambiguities that surround this particular ‘partnership’ in the context of a wider European development policy. Does the ‘African priority’ in European policy—once an important theme—mean very much anymore? As Europe faces the buffeting of the global financial crisis, affecting the very future of the euro currency zone, does the relationship with Africa assume more significance, or is a new subtle process of marginalisation at work?

This is why the subtitle of this book, ‘From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa’, has a particular relevance. The expression *Eurafrique* is very much a hangover from the colonial past, from the less attractive areas of European history. It was a theory of empire devised by a Frenchman in the 1920s, which later became attractive in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, as they saw advantages in a pan-European strategy for exploiting Africa’s resources and markets (which individual European colonial powers had for long been doing). While for the French and Italians this concept was part of an extended Mediterranean strategy that extended Europe to the south in a zone of continuous domination, for Adolf Hitler’s Germany in the 1930s it represented a way of recovering lost colonies, while fuelling Germany’s industrial powerhouse. This was also taken up by the Nazi-allied Vichy regime in France in the Second World War (1939–1945), but was revived, very much with French inspiration, as a postcolonial strategy.

By the 1960s, France found that its former sub-Saharan African territories were the only part of its former empire where it could maintain a powerful influence (unlike North Africa and Indo-China). The system of
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intensified cooperation that had been developed by France’s President Charles de Gaulle at that time was seen as having a European extension, using the ‘association’ policy that had been included in the Rome Treaty of 1957 at France’s insistence. This was often referred to as the ‘Eurafrican Association’, and posited a special symbiotic relationship between the two continents, involving prioritised markets and privileged aid, modelled on France’s own special relationship with its former territories.

The relationship was incarnated in the ten years of the Yaoundé Conventions of 1963 and 1968, which were criticised heavily by radical African leaders such as Guinea’s Sékou Touré and Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah. While the successor to Yaoundé, the Lomé Convention of 1975, eliminated the by now discredited language of ‘association’, and indeed of Eurafrique, the idea of an African priority for Europe (this time including all of independent sub-Saharan Africa) remained dominant in the twenty-five years of the Lomé Convention, which even Sekou Touré’s Guinea was persuaded to join. It also remained implicit in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement of 2000, although the geopolitical priorities within the EU Commission in Brussels had changed substantially.

There was a bizarre resuscitation of the Eurafrique concept by France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy on his first African tour in 2007, encouraged by one of his advisers, Henri Guaino, who also revived the idea of a Europe-Mediterranean-Africa bloc, with the new Mediterranean Union as a central building brick. (See chapter 7 in this volume.) If this produced a negative reaction in Africa where Eurafrique is still equated with the neocolonial notion of Françafrique, the idea can sometimes be detected (without having its name spoken) in some of the new security-conscious thinking about Europe and Africa increasingly prevalent in Brussels. The purpose of this book is thus in part to examine how far attitudes have changed in this relationship, and whether a new, more balanced concept, which we choose to baptise ‘Afro-Europa’—that is, an equal partnership of mutual interests without suggestion of a special relationship of more significance than others—can now become predominant.

One of the problems of writing about the relations that the European Union has with the developing world, and more particularly with Africa, is that this large and complex subject covers several disciplines. This means that the book has to deal not just with politics and economics but also with security, governance, migration, and identity. Most academic studies of the EU and its predecessor organisations, however, have focused disproportion-
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ately on economic aspects to the disadvantage of other critical subjects in this relationship. Even the substantial and serious body of work carried out by research institutes and think-tanks in Europe has steered around grappling with the more overtly sensitive political subject matter that is an essential part of the EU’s external relations. In short, there is a shortage of all-embracing treatments of the subject, extending to the history of European institutions and activities as a critical part of the history of the continent, including the history of ideas.

It is to be regretted, for example, that most of the major players in this relationship have never written memoirs of their experiences, from commissioners such as Claude Cheysson and Edgard Pisani, to some of the architects of Cotonou, and to more recent commissioners such as Louis Michel. The same can be said of the main Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) participants in this drama, with the exception of Nigeria’s former ambassador to Brussels, Olu Sanu, whose 1998 account offered an illuminating appraisal of Nigeria’s relations with Europe. Pius Okigbo, another former Nigerian ambassador to the European Economic Community (EEC), also wrote an early study on Brussels’s relations with Africa in 1967. There were a few helpful academic studies of Lomé in its early days, notably John Ravenhill’s Collective Clientelism, one of the first analyses of why the convention was not functioning well. More recently, the work of Kunibert Raffer has contained a series of telling arguments as to why Cotonou marked a definite step backwards from the positive aspects of Lomé, from the point of view of all developing countries.

This absence of personal accounts may be one of the reasons why the relationship is, to put it mildly, underpublicised, and in many cases unsung. This has sometimes meant that while it has been convenient and advantageous to operate without the glare of publicity, the relationship has often not received the sort of scrutiny that would have been useful to a deeper understanding of EU-Africa relations. Moreover, there are major changes going on in Brussels, arising notably from the enlargement of the EU from its initial six members in 1957 to twenty-seven countries and the consolidation of EU institutions in the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, that now inevitably demand much more attention.

On top of which, the dramatic troubles of the euro in the context of the EU’s poorer member states—such as Greece, Portugal, and Ireland—mean that a coherent global trade and development policy, targeted on a series of equal partnerships, especially in the ‘emerging markets’, seems to have
assumed greater urgency. As several of our chapters explain, in the context of a newly coalescing multipolar world the African partnership has its own place, especially in view of the mounting crisis between Europe and Africa over migration, one of the topics prioritised in this book (see chapter 20), but it is still hard to push it to the top of the EU agenda.

The growth of development policy

In November 1974, Claude Cheysson, then French commissioner for development in the European Commission, released a document called ‘Development Aid: Fresco of Community Action Tomorrow’. This was probably the first serious attempt by the Commission, which was then still at the core of the European project’s dynamic, to produce a coherent policy on relations with the developing world. It was way ahead of its time, because the early years of the concept had confined Europe’s relations with the developing world to the limited and partial device of the Yaoundé Conventions: a trade and aid treaty between the EEC and eighteen African countries, mainly former French territories, as well as a few limited trade agreements.

It was the enlargement of the EEC from six to nine countries in 1973, including Britain, that offered the opportunity for wider perspectives in the developing world. The context of the severe oil crisis of that year, which tripled global oil prices, ushered in a number of new ideas, such as that of a ‘New International Economic Order’ (NIEO). In the two-year negotiations that eventually produced the EEC-ACP Lomé Convention in 1975, there were those who would have liked it to extend to all developing countries. These aspirations came not just from the British, but also from those who had been keenest for British entry into the EEC, the Germans and the Dutch, with less enthusiasm from the French.

In fact, just as the North Africans had not wanted an intensive Yaoundé-style relationship with Brussels, neither did the Asians and the Latin Americans, who preferred a more relaxed development of relations with more emphasis on trade. Thus the fresco at that time was perforce incomplete, with many areas still to be painted in, while the traditional priority interest in sub-Saharan Africa remained for some time. Sights had been raised, however, and the cosy French-dominated Yaoundé idea, backed up, as we have seen, by the neocolonial geopolitical notion of Eurafrique, was buried, with the idea of ‘partnership’ replacing that of the ‘association’ policy that had been built into the philosophy of the Rome Treaty of 1957. The desire
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to reflect new thinking was seen in the opening paragraphs of the Fresco, which contained this statement redolent with aspiration, not to mention wishful thinking: ‘there are no longer donors and recipients: equality between partners is established’. 

Now, about forty years on, the European Union can claim to have put in place many of the ambitions expressed in the fresco. The concept of a development policy found its place in European treaties for the first time in Maastricht (1992), but has continued to acquire more substance. There is now a network of different instruments, not just extending to a variety of treaties, but also offering one of the world’s largest sources of total overseas development assistance. The financial prioritisation of Africa (and the Caribbean and Pacific companions) has faded as more and more financial provisions find their way to Asia (see chapter 8 in this volume) and Latin America, even if the European Development Fund (EDF) even now derives its budget separate from the Commission’s budget, an arrangement that goes back to the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The network of relations that began with the EDF delegates in each of the ‘associated’ states still reflects, to some extent, the piecemeal way it has grown. However, the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 has completed the establishment of a full European diplomatic service in which the idea of a delegation even in a place like Vanuatu is now subsumed into that of a European embassy, which accounts in part for the excessively high (and much-criticised) cost of the exercise.

Historically, the high point in Europe’s relations with Africa was the Lomé Convention of 1975. It was also, notably, seen as one of Britain’s main contributions to the new enlarging Europe, with a variety of progressive instruments, most notably the abandonment of trade reciprocity, or mutual access to markets, which was seen as unfair to developing countries. This concession persuaded a number of countries that Lomé would be worth joining, as did the fact that it was open to all forty-eight countries in sub-Saharan Africa. It was also, as is made clear by Adebayo Adedeji in chapter 4 of this volume, a great facilitator of Africa’s budding regional groupings, notably the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), whose treaty was signed in 1975—led by Adedeji’s own vision and energy—three months after the Lomé Convention itself.

Over the years, Lomé proved a disappointment, as its substantial aid programmes were mired in bureaucracy, and the principles of equality and partnership it proclaimed were occluded by continuing dependence, which worsened after Africa’s economic crisis of the 1980s. The convention had
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also become too bulky and unmanageable, growing in size but not in effectiveness, with each new accord. In 1990, Lomé’s life was extended from five to ten years, to relieve some of the pressure of negotiation.

After twenty-five years, revision was needed, but the opportunity was used by some, in what was by now the EU, to ditch the non-reciprocity that had been Lomé’s ‘jewel in the crown’. This was justified by the increasing pressures from the strong free-traders in the newly strengthened World Trade Organisation (WTO)—created in 1995 as a successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—but it was still too easily abandoned. The apologists for the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 proclaimed somewhat speciously that Lomé itself was outdated and even ‘neocolonial’, saying they were seeking ‘normalisation’.

From the ‘bonfire of the vanities’ of development nostrum of an earlier era, for example the scrapping of subsidising mechanisms such as Stabex (for commodities) and Sysmin (for minerals), as well as chapters on industrial and cultural cooperation, a simplified text was produced. This had a more pronounced political dimension concerning human rights and governance. Increasing importance was also accorded to the private sector’s role in development. But the main motivation for the ACP states to sign Cotonou in 2000 was, as with Lomé in 1975, the substantial funds available in the European Development Fund with which Cotonou entered its ninth incarnation.

In Cotonou, however, the EU, from guile or unimaginative thinking, imposed on the ACP group a new trade regime that, as well as incorporating revived reciprocity, divided the ACP into six regions—four in Africa (West, East, Central, and Southern), plus the Caribbean and the Pacific—that would be open to economic partnership agreements (EPAs). These would include free trade areas alongside other development instruments. Thus, at a stroke, in seeking, however admirably, to promote regional cooperation, Brussels managed to create new divisions both in the ACP group and within Africa, because regional groupings are still fledgling in the developing world.13 (See chapters 10 and 11 in this volume.)

This may have been well-intentioned, but it was bound to be seen as part of ‘divide and rule’ tactics, especially in 2007, when the EPA provisions of Cotonou were due to come into force. Thus the EU, and especially the Commission, which had anticipated some of these more divisive changes in its Green Paper on EU-ACP relations,14 were wrong-footed in a manner that damaged relations between both organisations, and caused the ACP to
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feel that Europe was trying to break up the grouping. It was true that the ACP countries, through having established a secretariat in Brussels in 1976, were not necessarily a very homogeneous alliance, but since the negotiations of the first Lomé Convention, of 1975, they have established a useful South-South solidarity that could still have its place with the right leadership. The EPAs, only partially completed by 2011, are still a source of distress and confusion.

Since 2006, visitors to Brussels have become more and more painfully aware that the EU is now pursuing two parallel strategies in Africa, which gives an impression of dysfunctionality. Since 2000, Brussels has sought to develop a partnership with Africa, largely through the African Union—then about to replace the Organization of African Unity (OAU)—although the absence of Morocco from the AU has meant that the ‘partnership’ is not officially with the AU. At the same time, strategic partnerships were developed separately with the Caribbean and Pacific countries.

This may well be seen as a logical evolution, but it springs from the view (now quite prevalent in European circles) that, for present-day Europe, the harnessing of three groups together as the ACP is an anachronistic absurdity. Some in Brussels have persuaded themselves that even Cotonou is ‘a relic’. This is ironic, since in the 1990s this was something that used to be said about Lomé. If anything, Cotonou was in fact a regressive step back from Lomé, a proposition few want to admit. Some have also argued that it belonged to the Cold War era, which is historically inaccurate, for the ethos of Lomé was above all politically neutral, providing large amounts of money to countries like ‘Marxist’ Ethiopia as well as ‘capitalist’ Côte d’Ivoire. The current increased attention to Africa, pushed by the Portuguese and encouraged by the French, has also been useful in masking any covert ‘Euroafricanism’ (see chapters 16 and 18 in this volume) by playing to wider security preoccupations in the post–11 September 2001 era.

This idea was articulated in the Africa Strategy of 2007, devised in Europe but filled out into a joint partnership strategy by the third EU-Africa summit in Lisbon. In many respects, this document duplicated areas of partnership in Cotonou, with the added dimension of security, as the EU itself has been falteringly developing its own security identity. (See chapters 13–15 in this volume.) In practical terms, this has involved close cooperation with the AU in assisting both capacity-building and peacekeeping operations, such as in Darfur, with funds taken from the European Development Fund, very definitely a Cotonou institution. The disconnect
between the Africa Strategy/Action Plan and Cotonou was visible at the EU-Africa Lisbon summit of December 2007, although the sour atmosphere there, expressed by the presidents of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade,16 and South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, was more focused on the EPA muddle.

Reports from the fourth EU-Africa summit, in Tripoli in November 2010, suggest that the problems surrounding this relationship have not fully dissipated. Although officially all went well, a story in *Le Monde*17 after the summit suggested that there were still serious areas of disagreement between Africa and Europe. Beyond the obvious continuing aggravation of the EPAs, the report mentioned immigration, human rights, and climate change, where the EU and Africa signal failed to find a common position prior to the most recent round of UN-sponsored talks in Cancún in December 2010, but a revised version of the 2007 joint strategy was agreed.

The report in *Le Monde* also noted that while there were eighty heads of state and government present, the leaders of Britain, France, and Germany were absent. And under a special deal, the host, Libya’s leader Muammar Qaddafi (subsequently toppled and killed by rebels backed by an Anglo-French-led North Atlantic Treaty Organisation [NATO] operation in 2011) agreed not to invite Sudan’s leader, Omar al-Bashir, for whom an international arrest warrant had been issued in 2009 by the Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) for alleged war crimes committed in Darfur. In return, African leaders appealed for the ICC process to be postponed. Even the predictable presence of the Zimbabwean leader, Robert Mugabe, produced little controversy, and there was little of the ‘sacred drama’ of Lisbon of three years earlier. The departure from power and later death of Qaddafi in October 2011 pushed the summit back further in political consciousness, even as there have been increasing admissions from European officials that implementation of the Europe-Africa Strategy continues to experience difficulties.

More positive takes on the partnership (and the Tripoli summit of 2010) have come not just from the usual official Brussels sources. A month prior to the summit itself, there was an optimistic take on EU-Africa relations from Ambassador John Shinkaiye, the Nigerian chief of staff of the chairperson of the AU, Jean Ping, at a conference at Chatham House in London on peace and security in Africa. Among the positive assessments of the AU-EU relationship, Shinkaiye’s speech contained two profoundly significant statements: first, that in endeavouring to build international partnerships, the AU has borne in mind that they should be ‘fully based on Africa’s
leadership, because without such leadership there will be no ownership and sustainability, because we understand those problems far better than those who come from far away, because we know which solutions will work, and how we can get there, and because, fundamentally, these problems are ours and we will live with their consequences.\textsuperscript{18}

Second, Shinkaiye delivered a clear warning:

Our continent is keenly following the European integration project and the efforts being made to meet the challenges arising from this project. In particular, Africa is interested in how an integrated Europe, at peace with itself, would project power as a cohesive whole. We are watching how Europe is balancing the re-nationalisation of political life, which one could detect from recent developments, and the pursuit of a collective ideal. If the former tips the balance, Africa will once again have to revert to the old \textit{modus operandi} of interacting individually with European governments in peace and development matters, which will be a serious setback to the EU-AU partnership.\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{The increasing stress on security}

Just as the 2007 Lisbon Treaty somewhat shifts power from the EU Commission to the Council, so the development of the 2007 Lisbon partnership represents a certain move in emphasis away from the ACP in the direction of the AU, even if, as one is still told in Brussels, ‘Cotonou is money’.\textsuperscript{20} The preference now in some Brussels circles is definitely for the Africa Strategic Partnership of 2007, with more emphasis on security considerations, which may eventually lead to the burying of the ACP in 2020 when Cotonou expires. There are those who apparently intend to work for that objective, pointing out that the functioning of the ACP group is entirely based on European money, and what Brussels proposes, Brussels can dispose of. But for the most part, such views are not found within the ACP group. Those on the European side concerned with implementing the strategy in 2010 seemed sublimely unconcerned about funding, saying ‘we are now beyond aid’. But we are also a long way from having an EU-Africa partnership that is a substantive power relationship. There are still too many ghosts of the past to overcome.

Meanwhile, it is Cotonou that still has the resources of the EDF, and remains the guardian of what is left of the emotional engagement with the ACP that was there from the 1970s. This spirit, surprisingly to some, has been revived by the signing in June 2010 of the renewal of Cotonou for another five years, at an EU-ACP Council of Ministers in the Burkinabè
capital of Ouagadougou. Significantly, for the first time, there is reference to the AU in a Cotonou document, which is encouraging, as there was absolutely no reference to Cotonou in the joint strategy of 2007, and the security aspects of the relationship bypass the ACP secretariat in Brussels, which has no military function.

Although this latest Cotonou renewal is no longer tied to that of the EDF (the tenth fund, totalling 22.6 million euros, lasts from 2007 to 2013), it has been accompanied by a new ray of hope for a flagging relationship. This has coincided with the arrival at the ACP House in March 2010 of a new secretary-general, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, fresh from running ECOWAS for ten years between 2000 and 2010, and is very familiar with the key trade issues. The Ghanaian diplomat has been facing up to the challenge by trying to infuse a new spirit of dynamism and direction into ACP House. All those familiar with the disconnected ways of the EU institutions (painfully on display in 2010 in the confusion over foreign policy and the laborious and costly setting up of a European diplomatic service) will be painfully aware of the mammoth dimensions of this challenge. There are those who doubt that the ACP as a group can last beyond the legal expiry of Cotonou in 2020, but as we have seen, there are others who would deeply regret its disappearance.

The holistic approach of the volume

The need to examine the EU-Africa relationship in a holistic way has dictated the priorities of this diverse collection of essays. There are many subjects of importance in EU-Africa relations that this volume is able to touch on only tangentially. For example, the tale of the European Commission’s particular and groundbreaking involvement in Africa from the Treaty of Rome in 1957 onwards is a mammoth study in its own right.21

With this in mind, the editors have divided the book into six parts, each with several chapters, to illustrate the multidimensional nature of the subject matter and facilitate the emergence of common themes, just as the parts interact with each other and the chapters speak to each other. Part 1 assesses the historical relationship of Europe with Africa. The first question it asks is how historical and institutional relations are analysed, given the compartmentalisation of disciplines. The second question, the one that lies behind the ethos of the whole book, is why the idea of Eurafrique has had such survival power beyond the colonial period, during which it flourished in
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certain circles. A third question posed is how the Lomé-Cotonou trade-aid continuum has come to relate so dysfunctionally with the ambitious plans for a Europe-Africa strategy. And last, part 1 asks whether the African Union has been wise to have placed so much emphasis on the EU as an institutional model.

In examining some of the EU’s strategic partnerships, part 2 poses the question of why Brussels has so far been unable to develop satisfactory partnerships with South Africa and the countries of North Africa, even before the latter faced the turbulence of 2011. It also poses the question of how such seriously diverse groups of countries can achieve an equal partnership. Part 2 further speculates on whether the struggles over regional integration in Europe (seen dramatically in the Eurozone crisis that raged in 2011) have lessons for Africa. Another question is whether Europe is not increasingly turning to consolidation of other partnerships. Finally there is a powerful question to be posed especially in view of ‘the rise of the rest’, most dramatically seen in Asia, about how Europe can maintain its strong ties with Africa, whose strongest trading partner is still Europe, in the face of rising challenges in the global balance of economic power from countries like China and India. From this naturally flows the crucial question of why Africa should in any way prioritise relations with Europe over partnerships with other possibly more sympathetic areas in the world.

Part 3, focusing on trade, aid, and investment, asks how sustainable Africa’s current investment boom is, and also how far the considerable economic potential of African states can last. This leads to the doubts cast on one of Europe’s major policy innovations of recent years: the economic partnership agreements in the Cotonou Agreement. Again, how far are these EPAs really promoting Africa’s regional integration as against Europe’s mercantilist inclinations? Part 3 also highlights the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, asking with passion, how damaging this is for Africa’s legitimate trading ambitions, especially on a planet growing increasingly aware of the need for food security. These discordant policies pose a basic question about whether the EU is really able to cope with the demands of international relations in a globalising world.

Likewise, part 4 examines the increasing role of the conditionality of ‘good governance’ in EU-Africa relations, asking about Europe’s uncertain ventures into the field of security, and assessing the effectiveness of these initiatives in the Great Lakes region and in Chad and the Central African Republic. It also asks the question of how far the EU, as an entity, should
really venture into the field of security in Africa, and whether the continent’s own need for security sometimes concedes too much in an area that in the past had been a proud and essential yardstick of independence. Another sensitive and related question is how far development budgets, above all the European Development Fund, should be reallocated for security purposes, however pressing may be the need of security as a prerequisite for development.

Part 5 examines the Africa policies within the EU context of France, Britain, Portugal, and the Nordic countries in order to assess how far their bilateral and multilateral relations in Africa have influenced their EU positions. It further asks how far it is possible to harmonise these relations in Brussels. It also asks how many similarities and differences there are between the countries selected, along with the question of how much those with strong historical connections with Africa have influenced the EU’s own policies towards Africa in the five and a half decades since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. How far do the historically progressive-minded Nordic countries have policies that resemble former colonial powers with strong historical African connections? Moreover, how can the interests of these strong relations coexist with those of the majority of the twenty-seven countries of the EU for which Africa relations are more marginal?

The concluding section, part 6, has to be seen very much in the context of changes already burgeoning in the twenty-first century. Not surprisingly, this part focuses first on the migration phenomenon from Africa to Europe. The pressing question is asked: how can Europe manage coordinated policies in an increasingly difficult economic situation? The deadly follow-up is to ask: how can Europe contain evident reversions to strident nationalism, bearing as it does the dangers of racism and xenophobia? A related question is: what further transformations could take place in the established mind-set of Europe’s view of Africa as the world potentially moves increasingly towards the development of ‘postracial societies’, as evidenced by the historic election of Barack Obama in the US in 2008. This leads to a final question: how do we solve the ultimate riddle of Europe’s true postcolonial identity and role? Indeed, how far can that role be relieved of the delusions of the past, and sanitised and modernised?

Part 1 begins with a chapter by Kaye Whiteman, a former fonctionnaire at the European Commission in Brussels between 1973 and 1982 and a British historian and journalist, who provides detailed historical background. He examines the rise and fall of the idea of Euafrique from the
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Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 to the EU-Africa summit in Tripoli in 2010. He then looks at aspects of the historical relationship, especially the evolution from the colonial nexus to the different ways in which more equal relations were often painfully sought in the postcolonial relationship, as recounted in the first part of this introduction.

Whiteman’s chapter also details the central role that France has played in European policy on Africa from the beginning. Indeed it is probably the France-Africa relationship that has moulded how Europe-Africa relations have been structured and perceived more than any other. Next, Nigerian scholar Adekeye Adebajo undertakes a comparative study of the evolution, development, and achievements of the African Union and the European Union, focusing on the key political, economic, and legal institutions of both bodies, before seeking to draw some lessons for regional integration in Africa from the European experience.

In part 2, five chapters assess the political, economic, and strategic dimensions of the Africa-Europe relationship. Two chapters—from opposite ends of the development spectrum—analyse the continued difficulties in the dialogue between the Europe and Africa. Nigerian scholar-administrator Adebayo Adeleji draws from his varied experiences as academic, politician, and international civil servant, which has permitted him to cover magisterially the widest range of material and dwell frankly on some of the underlying political issues that have all too often been ducked in some of the blander literature on Europe-Africa relations. He provides a history of integration efforts in Africa and what he regards as Europe’s often pernicious role in stalling such efforts, before suggesting constructive ways in which the EU can support contemporary African efforts at pursuing regional integration.

Rob de Vos, a distinguished Dutch diplomat with long experience of Africa, calls for an end to Western economic aid to Africa, urging greater investment instead. He also recommends better institutional organisation in Africa and more honesty in Europe, but above all advises that ‘the sooner this dependence on aid funding vanishes, the better the EU-Africa relationship will become’. Three more chapters focus on strategic engagement with the EU. South African scholar Talitha Berelsmann-Scott examines the important strategic relationship between South Africa and the EU, noting that this is only one of ten such bilateral relations (along with the US, Canada, Mexico, China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, Brazil, and India). She examines both the political relationship and the free trade agreement that
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Tshwane (Pretoria) concluded with Brussels in 2000, as well as the impact of the damaging spat over the EPAs. Longtime Maghreb and Middle East observer and British scholar George Joffé, in his chapter on the EU and North Africa, argues that the Maghreb countries in particular are on the front line of migration problems. Their imperatives are different from those of the wider Middle East, and whereas the succession of European plans for a political settlement in the Middle East have tended to become blocked, the Mahgreb and Egypt will be on the front line of any quest for genuine partnership in the Mediterranean. The cataclysmic events of the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011 and their implications for Brussels’s plans with the Mediterranean are also briefly discussed.

Pakistani analyst Shada Islam shows in the final chapter of this section how much the rise of the economic power of Asia, and Europe’s need to take this into account, underline the continuing tendency to marginalise of Africa, in spite of recent signs of a turnaround in Africa’s economies, due in part to the growing influence of Asian power. She argues that Africa can learn lessons about how Asia is engaging the EU.

In part 3, four chapters focus on issues of trade, investment, and development. These chapters bring an important global perspective to the Europe-Africa framework, indicating how much the growth of relations between the EU and all developing countries (many of which now also come into the definition of ‘emerging markets’) have altered perspectives in Brussels. Irish economist Liam Halligan brings a refreshingly frank economic perspective, especially in the context of the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, arguing for a strong private sector role in Africa’s socio-economic development and viewing Africa as the world’s ‘last investment frontier’, in stark contrast to widespread stereotypical views of the ‘Dark Continent’ of European lore.

German economist Mareike Meyn revealingly dissects the vexed and complex question of the economic partnership agreements, which hang like a pall over the relationships in Africa of both the EU’s member states and its own institutions. There is also room for one of the great unstudied areas: the political dimensions of the operation of the European Development Fund. This is now in its tenth incarnation, and has spawned a great deal of developmental literature, some of it adulatory and respectful, some of it doubting or, in a few cases, deeply damning. Despite this coverage there has been prevarication around the political story—for example, the extent to which there have been disasters, wastefulness, and the funding of ‘white
elephants’ is a subject that has only occasionally been excavated, and this volume is unable to dwell on it.

Kenyan scholar Gilbert Khadiagala, in his forthright analysis, provides an African perspective on the EPA debate, tracing the pernicious impact of what he regards as Europe’s mercantilist approach on each subregion in sub-Saharan Africa. He further argues that Europe is disengaging from its former African ties through the multilateralisation of its relations with Africa using institutions such as the Group of Eight (G8) industrialised countries. More work has been done on the EU’s 50 million euro (in 2010) annual Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), but not so much as far as its interrelationship with the development policy, with which it is often in contradiction. This is one of the main themes of Zimbabwean scholar Charles Mutasa’s chapter on the CAP which calls on EU governments to provide more generous development assistance to African governments, especially in the area of agriculture and human development, and advocates a phasing out of agricultural subsidies.

The way in which the development policies of European member states impact on the EU’s own policies is a major and intricate subject in its own right, one on which it has not been possible to dwell in detail, although it cannot help intruding on this volume. In part 4, three chapters examine the security and governance aspects of the EU-Africa relationship. South African scholar Garth le Pere provides a critical overarching frame of the governance and security aspects of the relationship, arguing that the EU has continued some of the colonial practices of the past even as it seems to be striving to become an ‘ethical power’.

Aldo Ajello, the veteran Italian diplomat who was EU Special Representative to the Great Lakes region between 1996 and 2007, provides a firsthand account of the EU and the turbulent politics of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), while German analyst Winrich Kühne provides a fascinating treatment of the involvement of the EU in deploying troops to Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008–2009. Both of these rich case histories assess the interplay of national politics—particularly the controversial French role, Brussels’s evolving security role, and the difficulties in the peacekeeping partnership between the EU and the United Nations—on the EU’s geostrategic chessboard, which forms an essential part of these narratives. The limited success of pan-European attempts at intervention, despite some positive contributions to stability in both regions, highlights the continuing struggle the EU has been experiencing in
building its unity, even though it is felt in Brussels that there has been slow but gradual progress in that direction.

The security dimension of the EU’s relations with Africa has to be considered in its broadest sense, a sense that is now taken on board in Brussels. While Europe is aware of the limits to its possibilities of intervening in Africa in the way that France, for example, was able to do in the first forty years of the post-independence era, since 1960, there has still been a concerted effort to pursue a European security policy in Africa. This has been helped by Africa being forced to take more responsibility for its own security as a result of Western military disengagement from the continent after the UN debacle in Somalia in 1993.

The EU’s willingness to find ways of being militarily involved in Africa has been encouraged by France (seeking ways to justify its own continued military presence in Africa). This has been seen in the way that, from 2005 onwards, 250 million euros over three-year periods have been diverted from the European Development Fund into a security project, called the African Peace Facility, most notably in support of the AU’s operations in Darfur, but also backing the proposed African Standby Force, consisting of five subregional peacekeeping brigades. This is a development that would have been hard to imagine in the early days of the EDF. Even though there was always a certain amount of what the French call dosage—or political payoffs—there had never been a security element to the fund.

We have, in part 5, examined the positions of some of the leading European players. Our four chapters—on France, Britain, Portugal, and the Nordic countries—have been chosen in part because of the heavy legacy of the colonial policies of Paris, London, and Lisbon in Africa, but also because of the proactive role that, on various occasions, these countries and the Nordics have played in EU policy formulation. In a rich case study, Paris-based American scholar Douglas Yates shows how the French administration of Nicolas Sarkozy has sought, since 2007, to use the EU to multilateralise its military interventions in Africa, as a result of the discrediting of the French military role on the continent after the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Yates’s chapter trenchantly examines some of the more dangerous moves by France’s unpredictable president, Nicolas Sarkozy. Disillusionment on the part of francophone Africans with Paris’s attitude and policies could become a determining factor in changing views on Europe in Africa, as the whole continent reacts to some of the more intolerant and racist positions that ‘the old continent’ has been taking. The inconvenient truth
The presence of millions of African migrants in Europe, and the desire of many more to be there, is a direct consequence of the colonial past. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, migration has moved up everyone’s agenda because of the impact of the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001. Concern at perceived ‘terrorist’ issues has not only enhanced preoccupation with security, but also exacerbated both xenophobia and Islamophobia.

British scholar Paul Williams dissects the various points at which Britain’s role has been significant, noting that between 1997 and 2011 London did not treat the EU as a major theatre for conducting its foreign policy towards Africa, with the exception of Zimbabwe. Britain played a more active economic role in Africa than a military one, with the exception of a brief intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000. Likewise, British analyst and longtime Lusophone Africa expert Alex Vines shows how Portugal has increasingly sought to act as a bridge between Europe and Africa on the basis of historical ties with its former African colonies: Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and São Tomé and Príncipe.

Norwegian scholar Anne Hammerstad skilfully explains the evolving Africa policies of the Nordic states (Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Finland), arguing that while still among the most generous and progressive aid donors in the world, these countries are increasingly pursuing their national interests in their Africa policies. Highlighting these countries is in no way to deny the importance in the complex kaleidoscopic picture of the Germans, the Belgians, the Spanish, and the Dutch, all of whom figure prominently in Europe’s history in Africa, and crop up again and again in different chapters in this book—for example in the views of Dutch diplomat and experienced development expert Rob de Vos in part 2.

The three chapters of the final part of this book focus on migration and identity issues that have been an important part of Africa-Europe relations. Migration has a direct link to the increasingly pressing question of security, which also features prominently in several chapters in this book. The impact on Europe’s own politics has been seen alarmingly in well-known liberal countries such as Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, where immigration issues caused swings to the xenophobic right, a trend seen in several other EU member countries. British scholar Andrew Geddes is concerned in his chapter with migration issues and with attempts to regulate them at a European level, and argues that growing tensions on migration in EU member states have now acquired an important EU resonance. From now
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on, he concludes, any analysis of migration and asylum issues in Europe must factor developing countries into the framework. Two chapters focusing on different aspects of ‘identity’, broadly defined, then round off the volume. Kenyan scholar Ali Mazrui has put forward, over fifty years, views that have often challenged the received wisdom of Western academia on issues such as cultural colonialism and neocolonialism, peace and security, the vagaries of development aid, and the significance of regional integration. His prophetic contribution here focuses on the impact of the rise of the Kenyan-Kansan president of the US, Barack Obama, on international perceptions of Africa and its place in the international community in the era of what Mazrui calls ‘post-racialism’. He uses powerful examples from the European literary canon—William Shakespeare and Aleksander Pushkin—to make diasporic links between Africa, Europe, and the US, a geographical area that has been described as the ‘Black Atlantic’.

The concluding chapter by German scholar Hartmut Mayer considers the issue of Europe’s own evolving identity in the twenty-first-century world and its attempts to become an ‘ethical power’ defined by promoting what American scholar Joseph Nye described as ‘soft power’: getting others to desire what one wants, and using nonmilitary tools of persuasion to attract allies rather than using military tools of ‘hard power’.

We have followed the language of the 2007 joint strategy agreed at Lisbon in referring to the EU partnering with ‘Africa’ rather than as such with the AU, as strictly speaking, for complex political reasons, the partnership, while existing de facto, is not between two organisations. This has historical roots in the Western Sahara issue, which nearly broke up the former OAU in the early 1980s, and has still been frozen ever since Morocco quit the organisation in November 1984 after diplomatic recognition of the Algerian-backed Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic by a majority of the organisation’s membership.

Finally, this study hopes to contribute to the promotion of dialogue between Africa and Europe based on genuine equality and mutual respect. We argue that Africa and Europe still appear not to have fully escaped the burdens of history, and examine the feasibility of elaborating and practising, in future, an ‘Afro-Europa’. At the heart of the book is the desire to make the Afro-European relationship equal. By highlighting the negative impact of some European policies, and drawing attention to the lack of commitment in some quarters in Africa truly to stand up to these policies, the book challenges our current understanding of benign policies in Europe towards
Africa. The year 2011 showed how rapidly assumptions can change, and how swiftly the balance of global economic power can unleash unexpected forces. Europe should be grateful that it still has some advantages in Africa, and must ensure that it is not too late to work out a new relationship of genuine equality, partnership, and mutual self-interest between both continents that sheds the baggage of the Eurafrique past.

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